The 16th in the Breakthrough in Normandy:

July 29-August 18 1944

Excerpt from: The 16^th Infantry: 1798-1946 by Lt. John W. Baumgarten, 1^st Sgt. Al de Poto, Sgt. William Fraccio, Cpl. Sammy Fuller (no date).

Other pages: Go to "Omaha Beachhead" / 16th Regiment Contents

Normandy Front: 7-11 August 1944 Map from BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT.

Closing the Argentan-Falaise Pocket. Detail of map with la Ferte-Mace at bottom center. (Detail of map from BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT)

July 29-August 11

[In the vicinity of Marigny] The Second Battalion's patrols indicated that the area south of the Coutances-Marigny road was devoid of enemy. The result of that information was an order from Division telling the combat team to wheel to the south in its morning advance on July 29th. The 16th was to occupy a wide front on the north of the La Soulle River. All three battalions were ordered to move near the river but not to cross it.

The enemy left behind in the regimental area was caught in a hasty withdrawal. It was soon ringed in. When Gen. Huebner informed Col. Gibb that CT 26 was prepared to move southwest on CT 16's left, in support, the colonel told the general he didn't believe it would be necessary to commit them. For that reason CT 16 was given sole responsibility for the entire division sector north of the La Soulle.

The movement of the three battalions encountered no enemy action until at 1426 the Second Battalion reported itself under friendly fire which afterwards proved to be German. Near the objective, this battalion also met a little small arms fire, which was quickly eliminated.

To the left rear of the regiment, about 4000 yards, a concentration of 500 more enemy tanks as well as other vehicles was reported. The Air Force was flying many missions against this array of armor, and by late evening were able to report 50 tanks destroyed, 55 probables, 100 other vehicles knocked out and 3 or 4 road junctions shot up.

Throughout the early morning hours, the 16th had only negative reports. At 0948, it was put on a six hour alert. Additional reports of the enemy’s continued disorderly withdrawal came in and were confirmed by prisoners taken by the corps on the preceding day.

Enemy forces to the front remained inactive, although reports of intense action, including several counterattacks came in from units several miles to the south and east. One of these by the Second SS Panzer Division resulted in the breakthrough of 12 tanks and 200-300 infantrymen. These, and one other group, were soon pocketed but at the cost of rather heavy casualties. The air force continued active and reported hundreds of vehicles—tanks, SP guns and trucks—destroyed. 

Trucks were supplied the 16th and at 1800 hours, orders came for an administrative move through La Chapelle to Cerisy La Salle, Notre Dame Le Cemlly, then to St. Martin de Cenilly. From there, a foot movement would be made to an assembly area north of St. Denis le Gast. There the commanding officer would receive sealed orders from the division.

At 0118 hours, the Third Battalion was ordered to the IP. Personnel were warned to be on the lookout for enemy stragglers in the assembly area. The First Battalion followed the Third with the Second last in line. Heavy fog slowed progress. 

By 0944, the battalions were in their assembly areas north of St Denis le Gast, awaiting orders. To the south, the Sienne River was being crossed by one of the armored units. Gen. Huebner ordered the 16th to patrol down to the river to see if any crossing, other than the bridge used by the armor, was available.

An indication of the state of the Germans at this time was the fact that a German colonel and his Chief of Staff were taken in a house several thousand yards in the rear by the Fifth Field Artillery. For two days they had not known where the lines were.

At noon, reports showed that the 18^th and 26^th CT’s already across the Sienne and the British five miles to the south of Caumont. Prisoners admitted that resistance was isolated and that it had become a case of every man for himself.  

Col. Gibb decided to use the unimproved road through St. Denis le Gast in the coming move. At 1725 hours, Division informed the 16th that it appeared more likely that the regiment would move in the morning because armor would operate in front of the combat team and it would have to go into a tank harbor for the night, thus holding up any possible night advance the foot troops might expect to make.  

However, at 1745, both Corps and Division contacted Col. Gibb with the following order. “Progress with all possible speed to first objective. Air reports nothing in front of us. Forced march, or shuttling, which ever you have to use.”

CT 16 began to move. Progress continued without incident until, at Gavray, the march was held up by a bridge which was being repaired. By 2150, units were on the road again and were more than 2000 yards south of Gavray, Shortly afterwards, the column was again held up. Men were notified to bed down, but to be prepared to move on an hour’s notice.  

At 0015, on August 1st, the enemy air force, long inactive, struck back with a vengeance. A sizeable group hit the regiment’s forward CP. Vehicles, jammed along the road, offered an inviting target. For twenty minutes there was the whistle of falling bombs. When short lulls came, men would try to find better cover, only to be hit by the fragments of delayed action anti-personnel bombs. Anti-Tank Company was hardest hit, losing 1 man killed, 1 officer and 16 EM wounded. “I” Company had 2 men killed, 13 wounded and there were as many more wounded from other units of the regiment. Attached organizations suffered heavily, also. 7th Field Artillery had 10 casualties. Its Major Marklis, just one week out of the hospital, was killed.  

The following day, the regiment moved southward again. By mid- afternoon, it was at a point about 5000 yards to the south and slightly to the east of Gavray. There, in the vicinity of la Quesniere and le Mesnill- Rouges, it held up, awaiting new orders. These came at 0300 the following morning. It was evident that a broken German army, fleeing southward toward Mortain and heavily attacked from the air in its flight, could soon be entrapped. The First Division was ordered to continue the attack on southeast with CT 18 on the right, CT 26 on the left, and the 16th in reserve. The division advance was to be spearheaded by CCA of the Third Armored Division.  

CT 16 would cover the right flank of the division and be prepared to advance to support the 18th or 26th on orders from the commanding general.  

On August the 2nd, the regiment moved. Mid-morning, found them across the See River without incident. The uninterrupted move confirmed the supposition that there would be no serious enemy obstruction of the river crossing.

Originally scheduled to stop and organize defensively, on Hill 202 to the north of la Chaple Uree, things had gone so well that the Third Battalion was ordered to continue to the town and maintain observation from the high ground around it until relieved.

In position first, on the left, the Third Battalion was ordered to be prepared to engage the enemy if a counterattack then in progress (at 1140 hours) succeeded in breaking through the Third Armored Division’s CCB, some 3000—4000 yards to the east. A little artillery fire came in on the battalion shortly afterwards, but it apparently was not coordinated with any concerted enemy effort to stop the advancing Americans.

Because of the difficulty of transporting supplies over the jammed roads leading to the rear, artillery ammunition was drastically rationed at this point. Artillery was to be fired only on observed targets, except in case of extreme emergency. Between 1500 and 1600 hours, the enemy became active in the vicinity of Le Cresnays, some 2000 yards to the east. Enemy tanks were firing. Other engagements between groups of armor, in the same neighborhood, were sufficient to keep the First and Third Battalions continuously on the alert. The only activity during the night was a bombing of the First Battalion and the regimental CP—by American planes—in which one EM was wounded.

On August 3rd, two battalions, the First and Third, were ordered to relieve elements of the 18th. There had been report that the enemy was in Juvigny. Later these reports changed to one which indicated the Germans had left that town. However, the change was made, in the face of considerable difficulty caused by traffic jams.

Pockets of the enemy were reported in the area. Most of them were bent on breaking out of their individual traps and when encountered were reported to be resisting furiously. One strong German patrol infiltrated through the lines of the 18th Infantry and engaged in a sharp fire fight with the MP’s around the regimental CP.

The Third Battalion, in order to forestall any other such activity was ordered to patrol both on foot and in vehicles, continuously. The other two battalions were placed to defend the right flank of the division. To insure the CP itself against such an incident as had annoyed the 18^th, the I & R platoon was outposted around the CP area Before midnight an enemy burp gun opened up on one of the I & R posts. Other isolated fire from the enemy indicated a small unit either bent on harassing the 16th or escaping from encirclement. Having moved south about 4000 yards and east another 10,000, the Second Battalion was busy cleaning out woods just north of Juvigny le Tertre. Just before midnight, there was machine gun and small arms fire from the vicinity of the town, but it was quickly silenced.

Prisoners picked up in the early morning hours of August 4th indicated that the enemy’s arms situation was deplorable.

These men said they were part of a group of 100 who had among all of them only 2 machine guns and some mortars. An “F” Company patrol, 3000 yards north, of Juvigny le Tertre encountered a German outpost which refused to surrender and was wiped out. However, south of Juvigny, another patrol from the same company had one man killed by a combination of mortar and small arms tire. Both these actions occurred after daylight.

The remainder of the morning and the early part of the afternoon found the regiment encountering no more than a scattering of small arms fire. This situation continued until 1350 when a tank appeared and tired several rapid rounds at the First Battalion before being driven off by fire from that unit. The remainder of the day passed with no particularly disturbing incident except the bombing of the same battalion by friendly planes. The Third lost three men and a jeep to tank fire.

Shortly after midnight on August 5th, enemy planes in force bombed south and southwest of the CT 16 area. Within an hour artillery fire fell in the vicinity of the regimental CP and the Second Battalion Extensive patrolling encountered a scattering of small arms resistance all of which was quickly eliminated. Aside from these details, trivial as compared with some of the fighting in the previous two months, the night was quiet.

In the morning a 14-mile move was begun to the neighborhood of Buais 8-10 miles south of Mortain. The position was to have been defensive but since the enemy had fled, it became an assembly area.

Following what had become a regular nightly schedule, German planes came over shortly after midnight, August 6th, and bombed near the 16th area.

A proposed move to Mayenne the following morning faced the prospect of some difficulty when it was reported that anti-tank weapons, tanks and infantry were located somewhere along the route to betaken. The I & R platoon, dispatched to check this report, returned with the information that the enemy had departed. The reconnaissance had taken the platoon all the way into Mayenne which had been secured by other American troops.

Aron, to the east of Mayenne had enemy in it. Also in the same area there was a large calibre flat trajectory weapon that shelled the road between Mayenne and Aron. However, the only casualties resulted from shelling by our own 90th Division. Movement had been so fast the past few days that adjacent units sometimes did not know their neighbors were within miles of their actual locations.

“F” Company was attacked later and its TD’s lost one half-track in an exchange which cost the enemy a tank. This encounter occurred over three thousand yards to the south of Aron. At about the same time, the French Police reported Germans fleeing to the south out of Aron which would bring them into contact with “F” Company.

The regiment was deployed for all-round protection that night with special emphasis given to a defensive setup that would stop any attack from an easterly direction—and overhead, This latter matter was taken care of by 16 90 mm anti-aircraft guns which were scattered through the 16th in an effort to do something about the nightly air attacks which, even when they inflicted no casualties were a considerable nuisance anyway.

The night of August 6-7 was anything but quiet. The German troops concentrated in and around Aron made a determined effort to get out of a trap one side of which was held by the 16th. Their objective appeared to be the bridge in Mayenne. 1500 yards north of Mayenne, the Ninth Panzer Division, on the east side of the river pounded the First Battalion, across the river, with all kinds of fire including a great deal of HE artillery. Nebelwerfer fire came into Mayenne, itself. The Third Battalion answered with mortar fire and regiment called for artillery.

The enemy approached the bridge northeast of Mayenne. Lt. Col. Horner ordered the bridge mined, and the 745th Tank Battalion rushed a force of light tanks into the area.

One M-10 TD, protected by a platoon from “B” Company was captured by the enemy at 0100 hours. The tank had a radio and secret documents aboard. Col. Gibb ordered Col. Horner to do his best to recapture it.

The First Battalion received a constant stream of small arms and mortar fire. Facing Aron, it was in the center of a semi-circle formed by the three battalions around Mayenne. In this fire fight, which later brought artillery and direct fire in on the battalion, three TD’s were lost and 5 men from “B” Company were killed.

Throughout the early morning hours, before daylight, tanks were moving around in the battalion area. Most of these were assumed to be enemy, although occasionally one, or a group, would be recognized as friendly. In most instances the foot troops were forced to fight armor unassisted. Once when TD’s were available, three of them were knocked out and the fourth was forced to withdraw, leaving a platoon to bear the brunt of the enemy’s vehicular attack. However, at no time did the Germans effect a breakthrough. When daylight came, a general feeling of relief pervaded the regiment since it was felt that if the enemy had been unable to break out of the trap at night when darkness favored him, any counterattack in daylight could be handled with comparative ease.

While CT 16 surrounded Mayenne, the thrusts of the enemy, from virtually all directions at one time or another during the night indicated that CT 16 might be surrounded by the enemy. New reports came in that the Germans were being reinforced.

However, patrol action during the morning encountered no enemy to the east of the First Battalion which continued to be the center of the regimental line, facing Aron.

Late in the afternoon the First and Third Battalions came under machine gun fire, to which a little later was added heavy concentrations of mortar fire. 10 enlisted men from the First Battalion were killed during the day.

The Second Battalion used volunteer Free French young men and boys to filter through enemy lines to check the effect of artillery fire and to bring back information on enemy artillery positions. These natives could enter German lanes if they had nothing on their persons to indicate that they had been in contact with American troops. One tragic incident occurred when the affiliations of one of the youngsters was discovered from the fact that he was chewing gum. It cost him his life. During this period, these French youths were used with notable success by the 16th. Their courageous ferreting out of information regarding enemy strength and movements undoubtedly saved many American lives.

Throughout the morning of the 8th, the 16th continued to probe the enemy’s strength around Aron, and always these patrols were met with shell, mortar and small arms fire. In the Second Battalion area, German patrols constantly attempted to penetrate American lines. Most of these were either killed or driven off.

One fact became apparent from our patrols—a large number of machine guns had been concentrated forward of Aron. Whether these were to be used to support a counter-attack or set up to provide delaying action while the main body retreated could not be determined.

Light enemy aircraft activity was more of a nuisance than a danger. During the preceding night, there had been a little bombing which had been ineffective. In the late afternoon five planes strafed the Third Battalion, also without producing casualties.

For the next two days, all units were constantly alert to the threat of the expected counterattack. All signs pointed toward an enemy drive. Yet, the only encounters (aside from the fairly constant exchange of artillery and mortar fire) were patrol actions. In one of these, the I & R Platoon, feeling out the defenses, 5000 yards south of Aron, had one man, Sgt. Leyton, killed by an enemy machine gunner.

August 12-August 18th

The situation continued very nearly the same until August 12th—the 16th patrolled, the enemy shelled and neither side knew a great deal about the plans of the other.

On the 12th it became apparent that the biggest Allied drive since the original landing was in progress. It was developing with such astonishing speed that all the original thousands of Germans who, it had been hoped would be trapped by the St. Lo-Marigny breakthrough, plus a great many more, might be encircled. Armored spearheads had advanced to within 70 miles of Paris. With American forces swinging back to the northeast, and the Canadians continuing to press down from the north, all Germans to the west could be cut off, encircled and chopped to pieces in one large or many small pockets.

CT 16’s mission in the new plan was to drive northeast toward La Ferte Mace. Armor had already preceded the planned push, by-passing groups of the enemy which it would be the regiment’s responsibility to mop up.

The original objective of the 18th, the high ground around La Sauvagere, northeast of La Ferte Mace, was given to the 16th. The Third Battalion was to drive for this objective, the First was to go after Les Roussiers a few thousand yards north of the Third’s objective, and the Second was to be on the right flank, attacking toward the small town of Le Mesnil de Briouze.

The big obstacle in the path of an advance towards La Ferte Mace was the Andaine Forest and the Forest de la Ferte, both parts of the same, large wooded area. Reports had it that these woods were thick with enemy.

When patrols returned from Aron, after a final checkup, and reported all enemy out of that town, the withdrawal of the troops on line around Mayenne began. Late that night the Third Battalion set out. The anticipated difficulty in the Andaine Forest developed into a number of small firefights in each of which the enemy was quickly eliminated. Numerous ammunition dumps were taken on the swift sweep through the woods.

Approaching La Sauvagere, the objective, early on August 14th, the Third Battalion had “I” Company leading, on tanks, “L” following, also on tanks as well as TD’s and trucks and “K” company on foot.

“I” Company was given the mission of clearing out the town. Following stubborn resistance, the town was occupied. The brief but bitter fight cost the enemy 2 scout cars, 3 trucks, several dead and a number of prisoners.

“L” Company working northwest, established a roadblock 1200 yards out of La Ferte Mace. Their advance netted a bag of 21 German prisoners, one female collaborator and two enemy killed.

“K” Company pushed out of town to the northeast, engaging in several brisk fire fights in which they knocked out several enemy vehicles and took 4 prisoners. Before the day was over, the Third Battalion had added two perfectly good German tanks to its captured equipment.

Total casualties for the action were three officers and 19 enlisted men wounded. All officers and 17 of the enlisted men were from “I” Company.

The Second Battalion attacked to the north out of La Sauvagere on August 16th, “G” Company was fired on by two tanks and held up for a time until the tanks attached to “E” knocked out one of the enemy vehicles “E” Company, with its armor, attacked and occupied the high ground 1000 yards northwest of La Sauvagere. The little resistance they met was unorganized. Most of the enemy had fled, limiting their prisoner bag to 12. The remainder of the Second Battalion took Le Mesnil de Briouze against little show of resistance.

The First Battalion made the most spectacular attack in this action. Striking at night with amazing swiftness, the battalion took Les Roussieres in a sweeping assault that proceeded with such speed the enemy was unable to withdraw a sizeable portion of his forces. Profits from the quick seizure of the town were 100 prisoners, 13 half-tracks, one mortar, two 75’s, 25 to 30 machine guns, and more surprising still, one Mark V tank complete with crew. In addition, “C” Company accounted for n half-tracks destroyed by riflemen armed with bazookas.

The next day, the 17th, the Second Battalion ran patrols to contact the British who were driving across the 16th’s front. Artillery and mortar fire killed one enlisted man on one of these missions. By the 18th of August, the British were in Briouze, the enemy was withdrawing from the entire sector and the regiment’s mission was finished. The Caan-Falaise gap had been closed, great numbers of enemy captured and a race across France was about to begin.

With no assignment at the moment, the 16th CT withdrew to La Ferte Mace for a well-earned rest. Rehabilitation and replacement of personnel went on for about a week. At the end of that period of relaxation, the regiment made one of its longest moves of the war, travelling in convoy 150 miles to the neighborhood of Lardy, south of Paris. The big jumps were beginning. Paris, which a few weeks before bad seemed so far away, was about to be bypassed by the fast-travelling 16th. Other units were doing the work of taking the city. On this date, scattered resistance was still being put up in the suburbs of the city, but the bulk of the enemy forces had withdrawn from Paris to Corbeil (near the 16th’s area) on the 26th and from there to Melun, thence northeast in the general direction of Belgium.