Bob Weimann |
January 5,
2011
The lead prosecutor in the case, Maj. Nicholas Gannon, told
the judge Wednesday that his evidence will show Wuterich
killed five men who drove up in a car immediately after the
bombing.
Gannon said he also will show that Wuterich caused the deaths
of six people in one of four homes stormed that day by Marines
under his command.
Eight other victims who were killed in a second house also
died because of Wuterich's actions, the prosecutor said.
"The accused is responsible for the deaths of 19 of the 24,"
Gannon said…
What the
generals and lawyers forget is that the SSgt Wuterich
prosecution undermines their entire US Marine Corps tactical and
strategic war fighting doctrine.
In the late 70s
and early 80s, the Marine Corps completely reformed its war
fighting doctrine. The unique aspect of this reform is that it
was initiated at the “grass roots” or junior officer level.
The reform
doctrine (now current doctrine) was based on the US Air Force
Colonel John Boyd analysis titled: “Patterns of Conflict”
.
This brief consisted of 196 slides that Col Boyd verbally
hammered at you for 8 hours. If you could not give him 8 hours
to listen, you would not receive the brief, no matter what your
rank…and especially, if you were a general officer.
Colonel Boyd
developed the theory that a decision cycle
(Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action or ODAA loop) is
essential to adapting and surviving on the battlefield.
Boyd theorized that large
organizations such as corporations, governments, or militaries
possessed a hierarchy of OODA loops at tactical, grand-tactical
(operational art), and strategic levels. In addition, he stated
that most effective organizations have a highly decentralized
chain of command that utilizes objective-driven orders, or
directive control, rather than method-driven orders in order to
harness the mental capacity and creative abilities of individual
commanders at each level.”
In other words,
decentralize the decision making; push the decision making
authority down the chain of command encouraging initiate at the
lowest levels to seize fleeting battlefield opportunities where
ever they were suddenly discovered.
Of course, the
first issue for the general officers, as they attempted the
cognitive assimilation of Boyd’s discourse, was control. Their
question: “How do we, as division, corps and army commanders,
control these “Boydian” military operations? Col Boyd answer was
simple. “You control the whole thing with trust.” Trust in your
subordinates and with their trust in you.
The US Marine
Corps Warfighting Manual (FMFM-1)
states this strongly in several passages but best in these two:
Strong
leadership which earns the respect and trust of subordinates
can limit the effects of fear.
…trust is an
essential trait among leaders – trust by seniors in abilities
of their subordinates and by juniors in the competence and
support of their seniors. Trust must be earned, and actions
which undermine trust must meet with strict censure.”
(Emphasis added)
How can squad
leaders, who follow their ROE (Rules of Engagement),
their tactical training, their senior’s orders, possible exhibit
trust when they see one of their fellow NCOs in front of a
politically motivated court martial for their lawful combat
actions?
Yes, the
“accused” is responsible for 19 deaths, as is his platoon
leader, company commander, battalion commander and up through
the chain of command to the President of the United States,
however, they were lawful deaths because they occurred in combat
under a Laws of War ROE.
Semper Fi,
Bob Weimannn
LtCol. USMC (Ret)
