The Thundering Third
Platoon,2003:
The March to Baghdad
by Nathaniel R. Helms
Third Platoon, Kilo Company, 3rd
Battalion–the Thundering Third–1st
Marines is an enigma. It
is built for speed and power projection, the blunt end of American
foreign policy.
Its Marines are trained and equipped to crush their
opponents with unmatched aggressiveness, overwhelming firepower, and
incomparable espirit décor. History has already shown that 3rd
Platoon does its duty with unmatched valor and élan.
Its legion of critics says too much. During four
combat deployments seven of its enlisted Marines have been charged
with murder and other varieties of unlawful killing, a record
unmatched in American military history.
When Third
Platoon deployed in 2003 and 2004 it was led by 1st
Lt. Jesse A. Grapes, currently a Catholic school administrator who
joined up after 9/11 to defend the nation. Under his command were
typically 45 Marines; an assortment of NCOs, fire team leaders, radio
operators, riflemen, machine gunners and rocketeers that flesh out a
regular Marine infantry platoon.
His superiors and subordinates included some of the most experienced
and best trained infantrymen in the Marine Corps. Their stamp on the
institutional memory of the platoon is indelible.
“Infantrymen are the troops that close with the enemy and kill them,”
explained Navy Cross recipient Sergeant Major Brad Kasal in 2006.
“That is our only purpose.”
Kasal was Kilo’s 1st Sergeant when it went to war in March 2003. He
earned his Navy Cross fighting alongside
Third
Platoon in 2004.
Before the changing face of war in Iraq altered the
Marine Corps’ traditional mission of destroying the enemy to building
nations in 2007, the Thundering Third’s Marines sought peace through
firepower.
There was nothing about “First, do no harm” in their
ditty bags. That alien notion would be written in later. The
battalion’s business was maximum destruction; the more harm the
better, and business prospects seemed very good. By the end of 2002
the Pentagon had already issued warning orders to get ready for war
and the Marine Corps trained them accordingly.
Then as now the battalion belongs to the 1st Regiment of the famed 1st Marine Division – “The Old Breed” – the core
of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force headquartered at
CampPendleton. Its goal before
9/11 was instant readiness; be the firstest with the mostest.
Between periods of refitting and training in
California
the famous division’s Marines trained around the globe preparing for
the inevitable war already lurking just over the horizon. On September 11, 2001 it arrived.
The burgeoning conflict touched the Thundering Third early on.On
October 8, 2002 unarmed Marines from
Lima
and India
companies training for urban warfare off the coast of Kuwait on FailakaIsland were attacked by two Kuwaiti
religious extremists.
Only the bravery and foresight of a few senior NCOs and officers armed
with pistols and two armed guards with M-16s prevented a massacre by
the Kalashnikov wielding ambushers.When the shooting stopped one Marine was dead and another
wounded, arguably the first casualties of the second Iraq war.
The same deployment found the Marines from Kilo in Djibouti,
Africa
training for joint operations with other elite forces at a French
Foreign Legion base.The
horrific heat and barren scrub of Africa’s
Horn is a perfect place to get ready to fight in
Iraq. The Marines that would one day
become names in the headlines practiced there for the war that would
create them.
It was not all training at
Djibouti. On
November 5, 2002,
Third Platoon was ordered into a pair of CH-53 “Super Stallion”
helicopters for an unforgettable
midnight
ride complete with an aerial refueling over the
Gulf of Aden. Their objective was Yemen, where their mission was to
assassinate al Qaeda leader Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi.
Al-Harethi was al- Qaeda's chief operative in Yemen and a
suspect in the October 2000 bombing of the destroyer USS Cole that
killed 17 sailors
and wound 39 others. A Hellfire missile got him first and the mission
was scrubbed in mid-flight.
The culture of aggressiveness the pre-war company and platoon leaders
planted in Third Platoon in
California
training areas and nurtured in
Djibouti
and Kuwait
was inculcated into the young Marines by the end of 2002. Over and
over the platoon practiced body snatches, building clearing, and
breaking ambushes; always taking the fight to the enemy.
Aggressiveness, audacity, and overwhelming firepower was its mantra.
It was no accident the Marines were honed into razors. The fighting
spirit imbued in the impressionable youngsters by their superiors had
been ceremoniously passed on to each generation of replacements –
ensuring that the culture the fierceness would always survive.
Buck fever was still high in January, 2003 when 3/1 officially got the
call it had been waiting for. It had just returned Stateside from its
tumultuous Indian Ocean cruise when 3rd Platoon learned it
was slated to be part of the invasion force gathering in Kuwait to invade
Iraq.
It was assigned to Regimental Combat Team 1 – tasked to drive up Route
7 to Baghdad as part of the 1st Marine
Division commanded by Maj Gen James N. Mattis.
Mattis told them they were the cutting edge of the assault force that
would destroy Saddam Hussein’s army once and for all.
“Be polite, be professional, but have a plan to kill everybody you
meet,” was one of the rules the hugely respected general gave his
Marines to live by.
The young Marines in
Third Platoon were ecstatic. The men who were there say it was
high fives and oorahs all around. All the peacetime BS, the endless
lectures and repetitious training was over. So was the grinding
monotony of being warriors without a war. Two months later
Third Platoon invaded Iraq.
An Nasiriyah
Third Platoon, Kilo was blooded at a city called An Nasiriyah, about
100 miles south of Baghdad.
Initially An Nasiriyah was an Army objective, but the exigencies of
war had changed the plan.
The city was important because a highway that runs through it links
two important bridges the Marines had to secure to march north on Baghdad. The southern bridge crossed the EuphratesRiver and the northern bridge the Saddam
Canal. The Marines officially called the
highway between them “Route Moe.” To those who were there it will
always be known as “Ambush Alley.”
An Nasiriyah is also the place where future Pentagon pop star PFC
Jessica Lynch and 33 of her companions in the Army’s 507th
Maintenance Company were ambushed, leading to Lynch’s capture and
dramatic rescue. Somehow they managed to get themselves ahead of the
Marines who were supposed to secure their route.
Leading the Marines was 1st Battalion, 2nd Regiment, assigned to the
2nd Marine Division’s Task Force
Tarawa. It was still south of the city when the 507th ran into
trouble. The battalion was supposed to secure and hold the two bridges
so the rest of the Marines could move through the city.
Riding herd on 1/2 was an attached company of M-1 tanks. Behind the
tanks came the infantry companies, in order: Alpha, Bravo, and
Charlie, riding in lightly armored Amphibious Assault Vehicles
commonly called “tracks.” The Army wasn’t supposed to be anywhere
around.
Upon learning of the debacle ahead the Marines were dispatched to save
the survivors of the slaughtered company. They initially managed to
find five survivors and a line of burned out trucks. The rest of the
507th was dead, captured, or missing.
In the process of saving the soldiers the tank company became bogged
down in the mud guarding the northern approaches of the southern
bridge, partially blocking the road and slowing to a crawl the rest of
the gigantic convoy. The Fedayeen and Republican Guard troops dug in
around the bogged down armor revealed themselves with a devastating
fusillade of fire. The Iraqis would give Task Force Tarawa fits for
the next week.
Meanwhile the rest of the Marines approaching the city still expected
an easy passage. In the lead was the balance of Task Force Tarawa,
essentially a 2nd Marine Division formation. Lost in the massive
convoy following behind was
Third Platoon, an
insignificant cog in the 1st Marine Division. There was no
reason to think that an anonymous rifle platoon in that huge parade
would color the world’s perception of Marines for years to come.
“Marines encountered Iraqi
troops who appeared to be surrendering. Instead, they attacked -- the
start of a "very sharp engagement," explained Lt. Gen. John Abizaid,
deputy commander of the Central Command at a news conference later
that week. “It was one of the few times regular Iraqi soldiers have
fought, instead of surrendering or deserting.”
It was also the first hint of acrimony between Army and Marine Corps
brass over running the
Iraq
war that would have such a profound effect on
Third Platoon.
Abizaid was being crafty. The Iraqis didn’t appear to be surrendering,
far from it. The Marines had been told by Army intelligence the Iraqis
would surrender when they appeared.
Instead of surrendering, Iraqi soldiers and irregular troops supported
by tanks, mortars, and automatic anti-aircraft artillery fiercely
resisted the Marines from strong points they created in the blocks of
concrete houses and office buildings that lined Route Moe. The intense
resistance surprised and then confounded the Marines.
Hours into the fight the lead elements of Task Force Tarawa’s attack
were still bogged down by heavy enemy resistance and the unyielding
mud. Air Force A-10 “Warthog” close support attack jets were called in
to support their attack. Confused by the situation the pilots attacked
the Marines instead.
The Warthogs devastating cannon and missile fire knocked out at least
one Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) filled with Marines and damaged
at least seven other vehicles. Eighteen Marines died and at least 17
others were wounded in the incident and its aftermath.
In March 2004 Central Command
dismissed the A-10 attack as an accident
caused by “the fog of war,” a double-edged phrase that will be heard
again and again in this narrative.
Eight of the deaths were verified as the result of enemy fire, Central
Command determined. Of the remaining 10 Marines killed, investigators
were unable to determine the cause of death as the Marines were also
engaged in heavy fighting with the enemy at the time of the incident.
Third Platoon was still locked inside AAVs somewhere toward the middle
of a 20,000 vehicle convoy on
March 23, 2003 when it got the word to move up and enter
the fight. The enlisted men didn’t know anything about the situation
ahead. All they knew was they had been crammed for three days into
AAVs intended to bring Marines ashore from ships to beaches. Getting
out to fight was a welcome reprieve.
Lima,
3/1 got to fight first. Third Platoon spent the night south of the
first bridge listening to Lima shoot it out with the Iraqi Army and
predominantly Sunni Saddam Fedayeen on the other side. The fanatical
Fedayeen martyrs dressed in black and armed themselves with the best
equipment Saddam could buy. They were dangerous adversaries.
The Iraqis running away from the war called the Saddam Fedayeen “death
squads” for their propensity to shoot their countrymen who didn’t have
the stomach to fight. The Marines called the Fedayeen “ninjas” for
their uniforms and their uncanny ability to dematerialize inside the
warrens of walled houses where they hid. The Fedayeen fanatics and
their offspring in al Anbar Province would sorely test
Third
Platoon for several years.
The next morning the platoon received orders to get into the fight. It
was tasked with securing part of an 800-meter strip of Route Moe that
was interdicted by Iraqis armed with heavy machine guns, rocket
propelled grenades, and small arms. The Marine were told the enemy had
salted itself among the civilians living in the houses “so be careful
who you shoot,” one Marine said. It was a warning that would become a
familiar theme.
Kilo secured the shoulders of Moe the depth of a city block so the
rest of the stalled convoy could reach the second bridge. They
ostensibly did so following the untested rules of engagement
promulgated by Central Command. What they decided privately was
another matter.
The rules of engagement literally flew out the same window the first
Fedayeen fighter appeared in, the Marines who were there said. For
eight hours Third Platoon was exposed on a concrete highway
surrounded by the enemy. If something moved they shot it and if it
didn’t they blew it up - no remorse and no recriminations.
Cheering them on were embedded journalists providing America breathless accounts and
striking video of the fighting. It was the heady time in the news
business before the grinding war cost to much to report, before
political correctness changed the tone of the initial optimistic
reports. Occasionally the cameras would pan to a dead Iraqi,
Third Platoon Marine Alex Nicoll offers a vivid account of the action.
Other 3/1 Marines privately tell similar stories, but they are afraid
to speak out loud anymore. The pride they felt for their successes has
given way to fear of legal reprisals from listening government
prosecutors.
Nicoll, however, is a freer spirit than most. In 2003 and 2004 he was
a riflemen in
Third Platoon, an untested young Marine that
evolved into a deadly hunter in Iraq. Nicoll
lost a leg at the Hell House covering Kasal’s back.
“We drove into the city on tracks. We started taking fire so we pulled
off, the doors dropped and we all got down on the street and shot
people as they popped out. It was amazing. There were people all
around us. One gunner left a pile of dead bodies, six or seven bodies
right in front of us. It was incredible,” Nicoll recalled two years
later.
Evan Wright, Rolling Stone's reporter with 1st MEF's reconnaissance
battalion that later wrote
Generation Kill told a similar tale:
Dead bodies are scattered along the edge of the road. Most are men, enemy
fighters, still with weapons in their hands . . . . There are shot-up
cars with bodies hanging over the edges. We pass a bus smashed and
burned, with charred remains sitting upright in some windows. There's
a man with no head in the road and a dead little girl, too, about
three or four, lying on her back. She's wearing a dress and has no
legs.
During March 23 and 24 Task Force Tarawa roped off
the city to prevent the infiltration of Fedayeen reinforcements. 3/1’s
Marines and infantrymen from other rifle battalions in the 1st
MEF and TF Tarawa meanwhile destroyed the Fedayeen
and soldiers still interdicting Route Moe. Overhead Marines in attack
helicopters and jets pounded them as well.
3/1’s combat journal shows it received sporadic to
constant incoming light automatic weapons fire, mortars, and rocket
propelled grenades during the fight.
Civilian doctors said they had treated 900 civilian
injuries between March 23 and April 3 and stacked 250 victims in the
morgue, according to the April 4 Christian Science Monitor and other unofficial sources.
There are no official government statistics.
After the first three days Iraqi resistance along
Route Moe collapsed and the entire 1st MEF moved north on
Route 7 to Baghdad.
After
Third Platoon’s fierce encounter in
An Nasiriyah the rest of the campaign was relatively anti-climatic.
As perverse the observation seems almost six years into the war, the
combat between the bridges was the happy time for
Third
Platoon, one Marine observed. Despite the intensity of the fire, the
deaths of 18 Marines, and the huge number of civilian casualties, the
platoon suffered no losses and no one was charged with any crimes. It
was the last deployment that would happen.
At the end of 3/1’s deployment in late May 2003 the battalion staff
compiled a Lessons Learned list. At the top was the expectation of the
Marine Corps brass that killing the enemy was what the Thundering
Third was all about.
Nowhere was it mentioned that it was too late to turn off the switch
that had turned on the young Marines. They were locked and cocked,
killing machines already let loose on the enemy. There was no calling
them back.
The prevailing attitude is exemplified by comments then Maj Gen Mattis
made to newly arrived Marines at Al Assad Airbase in late 2003. Mattis,
perhaps more than any other officer in the Marine Corps during the
heavy fighting in Iraq, molded and
fostered the fighting spirit of his command.
“The first time you blow
someone away is not an insignificant event,” Mattis told his young
Marines in late 2003. “That said, there are some assholes in the world
that just need to be shot. There are hunters and there are victims. By
your discipline, cunning, obedience and alertness, you will decide if
you are a hunter or a victim.… It’s really a hell of a lot of fun.
You’re gonna have a blast out here!”
Almost exactly a year later Third Platoon followed his lead with a
blast of its own. The echo is yet to be stilled.
__________________________________________
Nathaniel R. Helms
Defend Our Marines
12 July 2008
Note: Nat Helms is a Contributing Editor to Defend Our
Marines. He is a Vietnam veteran, former police officer, war
correspondent, and, most recently, author of
My Men Are My Heroes: The Brad Kasal Story (Meredith Books, 2007).